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This article provides an analysis of the features, determinants, and effects of a 
series of reforms to funding the primary and secondary education systems in 
Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba during the past two decades. 
The principal focus is on the reforms that have shifted the authority for setting 
property tax mill rates for education and responsibility for funding the 
education system between school boards and provincial governments. The 
article reveals that, whereas Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan have 
followed the lead of six other provinces in centralizing such authority and 
responsibility in the provincial ministry of education, Manitoba has moved 
slightly in the opposite direction by reducing its role in setting property taxes 
for some classes of property and reducing its level of responsibility for 
funding the education system. The article concludes with some questions 
regarding potential future trends in relation to alignment of authority for 
funding education between provincial governments and school boards.  
 
 
Introduction 
During the past two decades significant reforms have been implemented in funding the 
primary and secondary education systems in the three Prairie provinces and Ontario that have 
shifted the authority for setting the property tax mill rates for education and responsibility for 
funding between the school boards and the provincial governments. Whereas reforms in Alberta, 
Ontario, and Saskatchewan have increased the authority of provincial governments and 
diminished the authority of school boards in setting those mill rates and, by extension increased 
the responsibility of the provincial governments for funding their respective education systems, 
reforms in Manitoba had the opposite effect at least with respect to setting the mill rates. The 
increased authority and responsibility of provincial governments in Alberta, Ontario, and 
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Saskatchewan is part of the general trend in recent decades toward centralization for funding and 
governing the education systems in Canadian provinces, which has been described in the extant 
literature (e.g., Dibbon, Sheppard, & Brown, 2012; Galway, Sheppard, Wiens, & Brown, 2013; 
Lessard & Brassard, 2005; Lawton, 1987; Lawton, 1996; Sattler, 2012; Tindal, Tindal, Stewart, 
& Smith, 2013, pp. 258–262). By centralizing the authority and responsibility for funding 
education under the aegis of the provincial governments, Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan 
followed the lead of six other provinces that had already done this by 1990 (i.e., Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and British 
Columbia). By 1990 provincial governments in those six provinces provided between 90% and 
100% of funding for education, and in none did the percentage of revenues generated by 
education taxes levied by school boards constitute more than 10% of the budget for their 
respective education systems (Langlois & Scharf, 1991). The result of the reforms prior to 1990 
in those six provinces, and in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan in subsequent decades, has 
been a convergence in funding the education systems among all provinces, except Manitoba 
where school boards are still responsible for raising a substantial portion of their funding by 
imposing their own property taxes. 
The central objective of this article is to provide an analysis of the reforms 
implemented during the past two decades that have increased the authority and responsibility of 
provincial governments in funding the education systems in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, 
and diminished it slightly in Manitoba. More specifically, the objective is to analyze the factors 
that provided the impetus for and shaped those reforms, the key elements of the reforms, and the 
position of various governmental and non-governmental stakeholders on those reforms. The 
article concludes with some questions regarding potential future directions in the alignment of 
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authority between provincial governments and school boards for funding education.  
 
Factors That Provided Impetus for and Shaped Reforms 
Several interrelated factors provided the impetus for and shaped reforms in funding 
education in the three Prairie provinces and Ontario from 1991 to 2012. The first factor was the 
increased pressure on the property tax base created by the financial exigencies of the education 
and municipal sectors. Municipal and school board officials alike were complaining of the fiscal 
challenges they were facing as a result of their joint reliance on the property tax base to fund 
their respective governance and service provision activities. In making their case they pointed to 
the challenges stemming from the compounding effects of the increasing costs, declining 
provincial transfers in some cases, and the declining “elasticity” of property taxes due to 
mounting complaints from ratepayers regarding the burden of the property tax load. Furthermore, 
municipal officials were complaining that escalating locally levied property taxes for education, 
which in some provinces exceed 50% of the property tax bill for ratepayers, were major 
determinants of the constraints that they were experiencing in generating sufficient revenues 
from the property tax base (Sancton, 2011, p. 301).  
The second factor was the shared concerns by provincial governments, municipal 
governments, and business associations that heavy reliance on the property tax base both by 
school boards and municipalities would have an adverse effect on investments in local and 
regional communities across the province (Woolstencroft, 2002, p. 277). 
The third factor was a demand from various categories of governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders for equity or fairness across school divisions in each province in the 
following areas: the level of property taxation for ratepayers; the level of funding for school 
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divisions; and the quality of educational facilities, equipment, curriculum, instruction, and 
student services. Proponents of the reforms argued that it was particularly important to achieve 
greater levels of equity and fairness between ratepayers, school divisions, and students who lived 
in areas with larger or stronger property assessment bases, and those who lived in areas with 
smaller or weaker property assessment bases (Woolstencroft, 2002, p. 283). Although there was 
a relatively widespread consensus on the importance of increasing fairness and equity, there was 
considerably less consensus on the means by which to achieve it. For example, some favoured 
reducing or completely eliminating reliance on property taxes and increasing the level of funding 
for education from the provincial general revenue fund. Others favoured having the provincial or 
local authorities levying a standardized province-wide mill rate for the education component of 
the property tax based on market value and pooling and redistributing funding either on an 
adjusted or unadjusted per-pupil basis. Still others favoured the implementations of various 
combinations or permutations of those two models.  
The fourth factor was the decline in the power of school boards to resist the 
centralization initiatives of the provincial governments. Their inability to resist such initiatives 
have been attributed to many factors, including the decline of legitimacy of school board trustees 
among ratepayers due to what they perceive as very low voter participation in school elections, 
low levels of accountability, low levels of efficiency and effectiveness in the educational system, 
and other weaknesses in the face of not only powerful provincial officials, but to some extent 
also powerful school bureaucrats (Levin, 2001, p. 11; Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). In the 
context of such a legitimacy challenge or crisis, provincial governments and their officials were 
emboldened to consider centralizing authority and responsibility for education funding 
(Woolstencroft, 2002, p. 280).  
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The fifth factor was the phenomenon of interprovincial policy imitation, lesson 
drawing, and convergence (Bennett, 1991; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Rose, 1993; Stone, 1999). 
Provincial governments paid careful attention to initiatives undertaken in funding education by 
their counterparts in other provinces. Notwithstanding considerable similarities in their strategic 
directions for reform, the various changes can be considered to be variations on a theme. This is 
a useful reminder that despite convergence in policy goals or directions, some diversity rooted in 
place-based policy-making is not only likely to emerge, but may be necessary (Bradford, 2005).  
 
Historical Reform Trends in Education Funding (1867–1990) 
During the 150 years since Confederation the precise alignment of authority and 
responsibility for funding the primary and secondary education systems in Canadian provinces 
has gone through three general phases. The general trend through those three phases has been a 
shift from a decentralized system in which local or regional authorities had extensive authority 
and responsibility for funding primary and secondary education, to a centralized system in which 
that authority and responsibility has been either completely usurped or highly circumscribed by 
provincial governments that have assumed increasingly more extensive control over such 
funding.  
During the first phase, which lasted from approximately 1867 to 1949, provincial 
governments established local governments and school divisions, which were granted the 
authority to collect funding for the primary and secondary system from the local property tax 
base. Provincial governments did not provide much, if any funding, for education during this 
particular phase. During the second phase, which lasted from approximately 1950 until 1980, 
education authorities continued imposing education property taxes, but provincial governments 
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assumed an increasingly larger responsibility for funding education from their general revenue 
funds (Tindal et al. 20013, pp. 258–262). During the third phase, which lasted from 
approximately 1980 to 1990, some provincial governments became increasingly more directly 
involved in generating revenue from the property tax base by supplanting, either in whole or in 
part, the property taxes levied by school boards with their own property taxes. By 1990 the result 
of this direct involvement by provincial governments in generating revenue from the property tax 
base was the creation of two general categories of funding frameworks for education. In the first 
category, which consisted of Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia, the funding system was highly centralized, as 
the provincial governments provided between 90% and 100% of funding (Langlois & Scharf, 
1991). In the second category, which consisted of Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and 
Alberta, school boards levied local property taxes to finance approximately 50% of their budgets 
(Langlois & Scharf, 1991). Whereas in Saskatchewan and Ontario school boards had exclusive 
authority for levying education property taxes, in Manitoba and Alberta the provincial 
governments had assumed a limited role in imposing property taxes. Despite those differences 
between these four provinces, in all of them school boards retained extensive authority and 
autonomy in determining how much revenue they would derive from the property tax base. As 
subsequent sections of this article reveal, during the past two decades that situation changed 
substantially in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, but not in Manitoba, as provincial  
governments in those three provinces started emulating their counterparts in the six other 
provinces in exercising greater control over education funding.  
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Reforms to Education Funding 1991–2012 
In keeping with the central objective of this article, this section provides an overview of 
the major reforms to the funding of the education systems in the three Prairie provinces and 
Ontario, the effects of those reforms on the alignment of authority between the provincial 
governments and school boards within those systems, and the positions of various governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders on the reforms. The review reveals that whereas in Alberta, 
Ontario, and Saskatchewan the reforms enhanced the authority of the provincial governments in 
funding their respective education systems, in Manitoba they reduced the scope of provincial 
authority.  
 
Alberta Reforms 
Alberta’s education property tax reforms were implemented very quickly by Premier 
Ralph Klein’s Progressive Conservative government as part of what was referred to as the “Klein 
Revolution.” Within one year of winning the 1993 election on a platform that emphasized fiscal 
restraint, his government enacted the School Amendment Act, 1994. This was a comprehensive 
reform package that included both a 12.4% spending reduction for the education system, and a 
mandatory shift in authority in setting property tax rates for education from school boards to the 
provincial government with an opting out provision for separate school boards. The principal goal 
of the reform was to reduce overall government spending on education. By removing authority 
for setting property tax rates from school boards and moving towards a provincially controlled 
uniform mill rate, the government sought to block school boards from increasing education mill 
rates in response to its cuts in transfers (Evans, 1999). The provincial government justified the 
uniform mill rate across the province on the basis that it would bring greater equity to property 
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taxation, education funding, education facilities, and education programs and services (Alberta 
Education, 1994; Alberta Education, 1995).  
In an effort to appease some critics of reforms and to avoid potential litigation in the courts, the 
Alberta government adopted two important measures. To appease those who would complain that the 
system had been over-centralized and did not allow any discretion for local preferences on the 
level of services and taxes, it authorized all school boards to impose a discretionary levy up to 
the 3% of their budgets if approved by a local plebiscite (Herman, 2013). Furthermore, in an 
effort to appease separate school boards and avoid potential litigation in the courts, the provincial 
government also decided to respect what at that time was still considered a constitutional right of 
those school boards to raise their own revenues without overcoming any major obstacles erected 
by provincial governments (Holy Spirit Roman Catholic Board, 2013). It did so by giving 
separate school boards the option of opting out of the provincial property tax regime and 
imposing their own levies on properties within their respective boundaries owned by ratepayers 
who were affiliated with and supported those boards. All separate school boards in the province 
chose to opt out of the provincial property taxation regime and to continue operating their own 
regimes. 
The Alberta government continued to allow separate school boards to opt out of the 
provincial property taxation regime even after a Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision on an 
Ontario case rendered in 2001 significantly fettered that right. In its decision on that particular 
case the SCC stated that although separate school boards in Ontario had a constitutional right to 
equitable treatment, they did not necessarily have a constitutional right to impose levies on the 
property tax base. The SCC added that the constitutional power to delegate authority to impose 
levies on the property tax base, either to any school boards, including separate boards, or to other 
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forms of local governments, rested with provincial governments (Ontario English Catholic 
Teachers’ Association v. Ontario, 2001; Canadian Secular Alliance, 2011).  
In implementing its original plan on the property taxation regime, the provincial 
government established a dual system for levying, collecting, and distributing property taxes. In 
the case of the public school boards, it established uniform tax rates for various classes of 
property. The municipalities collected the revenues and transferred them to the Alberta School 
Foundation Fund (ASFF) to ensure that property tax revenues would remain separate from 
provincial general revenues. The provincial government would then take the money from the 
ASFF and distribute it to the public school boards. In the case of separate school boards, they 
would establish the tax levy for all properties within their respective districts that were owned by 
ratepayers who were affiliated with and supported them, and the municipalities would collect and 
transfer the money directly to them (Alberta Education, 2011a). Despite this difference in 
process, the provincial government wanted to minimize the prospects that public school boards 
would either be given or be seen to be given unfair advantage over other school boards. 
Consequently, the provincial government granted itself the authority to adjust any differences 
between what opted-out boards collect from property taxes and what they receive from the 
provincial government in grants to ensure there is no special financial gain for school boards that 
opt-out of the ASFF (Alberta Education, 2011a). This was designed to ensure all  
school boards would have access to approximately the same level of funding on a per-student 
basis regardless of the precise source of the funds. 
Alberta’s new funding regime has had a significant effect on the proportion of funds 
derived from the property tax base and the provincial general revenue fund. Whereas in 1989 
property taxes constituted 42% of education funding (Auld & Kitchen, 2006, p. 13), in 2010 
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property taxes constituted 27% of education funding (Alberta Education, 2011b). Clearly, since 
the implementation of the funding reforms in 1994, provincial general revenues have made up an 
increasing portion of school budgets. 
Reforms to Alberta’s funding of the education system generated considerable 
controversy among the key stakeholders. The business associations were strong and visible 
proponents of the reforms. Indeed, because of their position on the merits of the reforms, 
Alberta’s provincial government ensured that the Alberta Chamber of Resources and the Alberta 
Chamber of Commerce were given a prominent place at the consultation table in developing the 
reform plan (Taylor, 2001). 
Municipal associations were generally supportive of the reforms because they hoped it 
would reduce pressure on the property tax base and provide greater equity in taxation for 
education across the province. However, they were somewhat passive in the reform debates 
because at that time they were negotiating a major reform package of their own that ultimately 
led to a new municipal act that increased the authority and autonomy of municipal governments 
in various facets of governance and financial management (AUMA, 2009). 
The Public School Boards Association of Alberta (PSBAA) and the Alberta Teacher’s 
Association (ATA) were united in their strong opposition to the reforms. However, they differed 
on which particular facets of the reforms they opposed most strongly (Taylor, 2001). Whereas 
the PSBAA was primarily concerned with the provincial government’s decision to usurp the 
school board’s taxing authority, the ATA was primarily concerned with funding cutbacks. The 
provincial Liberal Party supported these associations in opposing the reforms. In lending its 
support, the Liberal Party depicted the reforms as an assault on the education system, and a  
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power and revenue grab by the provincial government at the expense of school boards (Levin, 
2001; Taylor, 2001). 
 
Ontario Reforms 
Ontario’s education funding reforms were initiated and implemented just two years 
after Alberta’s reforms (Sattler, 2012). The basic features of their respective financial reforms 
were very similar. This is particularly true of the most significant aspect of their financial 
reforms, namely the provincial government usurping the authority of school boards in setting 
mill rates for education property taxes. The only notable differences between the two provinces 
in this respect were: first, unlike Alberta, Ontario did not give Catholic school boards the option 
of imposing their own mill rates on the property tax base; and, second, unlike Alberta, Ontario 
did not give any school boards the authority to impose even a nominal property tax subject to 
explicit approval by ratepayers. 
 In Ontario, as in Alberta, the financial reforms had three major effects. One effect was 
increasing equality both in the amount of taxes paid by ratepayers with properties of comparable 
value across the province, and also in the amount of funds received by school boards on per-
pupil basis. Initially, at least, the Ontario reforms also had a limited redistributive effect among 
public school boards as a result of some pooled tax revenues flowing out of areas with large 
assessment bases (e.g., Toronto) to areas with smaller assessment bases (Gidney, 1999, p. 263). 
Another effect of the reforms was a decrease in the proportion of funding for education derived 
from the property tax base. Whereas in 1989 education property taxes constituted 55% of 
funding (Auld & Kitchen, 2006, p. 13), by 2008 they constituted only 37% (Reiter, 2009). 
Despite the change in that ratio, the overall tax load on the property tax base did not change 
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substantially because municipalities had to rely on it to cover the costs for welfare programs that 
had been downloaded to them by the provincial government (Ibbitson, 1997, p. 239). The third 
effect of the reforms during the initial phase was reduced funding for the education system as a 
whole and for many school boards as part of the Harris government’s efforts to reduce the 
expenditure budget.  
The roots of Ontario’s reforms to the centralization of education funding can be traced 
to the 1995 election victory of the Progressive Conservative party led by Premier Mike Harris 
based on a campaign platform for which the slogan was the “Common Sense Revolution” and 
the principal goals were reducing the government expenditures and taxes. Within one year 
following that election victory the Harris government started framing a reform plan for the education 
sector as well as other sectors. The reform plan for the education sector started emerging in 1996 from a 
report produced by the education sub-panel of the “Who Does What” panel chaired by David 
Crombie. The sub-panel’s three major recommendations were: first, that the provincial 
government assume a large role in funding education; second, that it reduce the number of school 
boards; and, third, that it assume a larger role in setting the curriculum, performance standards, 
and monitoring the overall effectiveness of the system. In the case of education funding, the sub-
panel proposed that the government should mandate a uniform tax rate across the province for 
business taxes and reduce extensively the reliance of school boards on the  
residential property tax base to just 5% by providing provincial grants for education from the 
general revenue fund (Emond Harnden Law Firm, 1996).  
Within one year of receiving the education sub-panel’s report, the Ontario government 
enacted two key statutes designed to reform both governance and financing systems in the 
education sector. The first statute, enacted during the first quarter of 1997, was The Fewer 
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School Boards Act (Bill 104). It created what has been described as “a transitional regime of 
controls on school boards’ authority” (Emond Harnden Law Firm, 1997) consisting of two major 
sets of provisions that had an effect on education governance and funding. One major set of 
provisions dealt with the reduction of the number of school boards by approximately 50% by 
creating larger District School Boards (DSBs) grouped into four general categories, namely 
English-language public and separate DSBs and French-language public and separate DSBs. The 
reduction in the number of school boards resulted in the reduction of school trustees by almost 
66%. This was accompanied by a reduction in the maximum level of remuneration for DSB 
trustees from $40,000 to $5,000. The other major set of provisions established the Education 
Improvement Commission (EIC), consisting of five to seven members appointed by cabinet who 
were mandated to deal with various facets of the implementation of the new consolidated system, 
including establishing any “education improvement committees” required for various regions of 
the province, reviewing and approving the budgets of all DSBs for 1997, appointing auditors to 
review the finances of any DSBs, and making recommendations to the minister on a variety of 
financial and non-financial issues such as measures to strengthen the financial accountability of 
school boards (Maclellan, 2009). 
Bill 104, which was opposed by all the major associations in the education sector, was 
challenged in the courts by the Ontario Public School Boards’ Association (OPSBA), the 
Toronto City School Board (TCSB), the Metropolitan Toronto School Board (MTSB), and the 
Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation (OSSTF) on the grounds that various parts of it, 
including the powers devolved to the EIC to deal unilaterally with some matters that impinged 
on collective bargaining, violated their respective rights and harmed the education system. The 
judge who adjudicated the case rejected their arguments and ruled that the provincial government 
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had the constitutional authority to make the changes embodied in Bill 104 and that a court 
injunction to halt its implementation could not be issued until concrete evidence of actual harm 
was demonstrated (Dickinson, 1998; Maclellan, 2009). Although that court decision was not 
appealed, that was by no means the end of court action against subsequent reform initiatives in 
the education sector undertaken by the provincial government.  
The second key statute, introduced in last quarter of 1997, was The Education Quality 
Improvement Act (Bill 160), which contained several categories of reforms to the education 
system. For purposes of this article, the most significant reform was shifting the authority for setting 
property tax mill rates from the school boards to the provincial government (Herman, 2013). In 
addition to the provisions regarding the centralization of authority for education property taxes, 
Bill 160 had other important centralizing provisions, including each of the following:  
(a) limiting the authority of school boards in using some special purpose grants 
(e.g., for special education, transportation, education district administration, 
and school renewal and expansion); 
 
(b) increasing financial accountability requirements through several means, 
including requiring boards to produce and publish annual “financial report 
cards” that would allow members of the public to see and understand the 
revenue and expenditure streams;  
 
(c) eliminating the freedom of school boards to produce deficit operating budgets; 
and 
 
(d) authorizing the provincial ministry of education to temporarily take over 
administrative control of any school boards failing to submit balanced annual 
budgets.  
 
Bill 160 also removed, by provincial fiat, school principals from the teachers' collective 
bargaining units, thereby taking away their right to collective bargain through the teachers' 
unions and their right to strike (Bedard and Lawton, 1998).  
Bill 160 was met with strong resistance from various stakeholders within the education 
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sector, particularly most associations of school boards and teachers ((Paquette, 1998; Gidney, 
1999). The notable exception was the Ontario Catholic School Trustees Association (OCSTA), 
which entered into negotiations with the provincial government regarding the funding 
arrangements for Catholic school boards in light of Bill 160. During those negotiations OCSTA 
agreed to suspend for five years what it had traditionally asserted to be the constitutional right of 
its members to levy a local property tax. It suspended that right in exchange for the provincial 
government’s commitment to ensure overall equity in provincial funding for Catholic and public 
school boards. OCSTA’s decision to enter into that agreement was strongly opposed by the 
Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association (OECTA). The latter launched a court challenge 
in the General Division Court of Ontario to Bill 160 on the basis that some of its provisions 
abrogated the rights of Catholic school boards to access funding directly from the property tax 
base, notwithstanding any guarantees for equitable funding provided either in Bill 160 or any 
agreement between the provincial government and OCSTA for equitable funding for Catholic 
school boards. The judge who heard the case accepted those arguments and ruled that those parts 
of Bill 160 that abrogated that right were null and void.  
The Ontario government successfully appealed that decision to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal on the basis that the funding equity provided by Bill 160 and its agreement with the 
OECTA sufficed to meet the letter and spirit of section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
regarding the rights of Catholic school boards. In rendering its decision in 1999 the Ontario 
Court of Appeal indicated that the constitution merely guaranteed Catholic school boards the 
right to fair funding, and not the right to tax per se.  
Shortly after that decision was rendered the OECTA decided to appeal it to the 
Supreme Court of Canada in an effort to restore what they still deemed to be the constitutional 
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right and the traditional authority and autonomy of the Catholic school boards to impose taxes on 
their members. In its decision rendered in 2001, the Supreme Court rejected the OECTA’s 
arguments regarding the constitutional right of separate school boards and upheld the ruling of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of Bill 160 and the right of the 
provincial government to usurp and centralize taxing authority in relation to all school boards 
(Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Association v. Ontario, 2001; Canadian Secular Alliance, 
2011).  
Beyond the education sector per se, Ontario’s reforms to financing education were 
supported by some and opposed by others. Generally they were supported by business 
associations, which, like their counterparts in Alberta, hoped the reforms would result in a 
reduction of operating costs within the education sector and, by extension, also a reduction of 
property taxes on business and residential properties (Gidney, 1999). Ontario’s municipal 
associations had mixed feelings regarding the financial reforms. While they were happy that 
school boards would not have direct access to the property tax base, they were concerned about 
the direct and indirect effects that financial reforms within the educational sector would have for 
them (Siegel, 2009). They were particularly concerned regarding any mill rates for education that 
would be set by the provincial government and the downloading of financial responsibility not 
only for welfare, but possibly also for other functions which had been within the aegis of the 
provincial government. In its capacity as the Official Opposition, the NDP was also very 
opposed to the reforms embodied in Bill 104 and Bill 160. It used its position in the legislature to 
slow down the adoption of the provincial government’s statutory framework with various 
procedural tactics, including filibustering, but ultimately it was not able to stop the adoption and 
implementation of that framework (Maclellan, 2009). Its stance on the reforms was based partly 
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on political considerations, rather than exclusively on fundamental principles regarding funding 
regimes for education. The NDP’s stance was part of an effort to regain some of the support it 
had lost as a result of two unpopular measures it had imposed while in power earlier during that 
decade as part of the “Social Contract,” namely freezing teacher’s salaries and decreasing 
operating grants for education (Gidney, 1999). 
Although there have been changes both to the funding levels and financial management 
within the education sector since the Harris government imposed the reforms in the late 1990s, 
the basic elements of the education funding system that it established have remained unchanged. 
Successive provincial governments have retained their control in setting the mill rates for 
education taxes and for determining how much money either from the property tax base or the 
general revenue fund school boards receive each year.  
 
Saskatchewan Reforms 
Saskatchewan was slower than Alberta and Ontario in implementing the education 
funding system. After nearly three decades of contemplating various reform options, the 
provincial government followed their lead in appropriating the school boards’ authority for 
imposing property taxes (Munroe, 2011).  
Between 1982 and 2002 reforms to funding the education system were contemplated 
both by Premier Grant Devine’s Conservative government, and by Premier Roy Romanow’s 
NDP government in response to pressures from municipalities to reduce the reliance on school 
boards on revenues generated from the property tax base. Whereas the Conservative government 
contemplated adopting Manitoba’s “dual levy” approach whereby local school boards would 
impose one education levy on the property tax base and the provincial government would impose 
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an education levy through the income tax system, the NDP government contemplated adopting 
some version of Alberta or Ontario’s approach, whereby the authority of school boards to access 
the property tax base would be either eliminated or limited. The latter also contemplated 
increasing provincial transfers for education. Precarious fiscal and political situations at various 
points in their time in office, along with challenging policy and program agendas faced by both 
governments at various times during their respective mandates, ultimately constrained them not 
to pursue those reforms.  
The two provincial governments that followed them continued exploring those options, 
as well as others, for reforming the education funding system. The NDP government led by 
Premier Lorne Calvert did so by appointing the Commission on Financing Kindergarden to 
Grade 12 Education. The Commission’s main recommendation was reducing the proportion of 
funding for education derived from the property tax base and increasing the proportion of 
funding derived from provincial transfers (Boughen, 2003). Although the provincial government 
accepted that recommendation in principle, the precarious fiscal position it was facing precluded 
its implementation. Instead, in 2004 it promised a long-term solution to lower the education 
property tax and to introduce an education property tax credit program for farm properties for the 
subsequent three years costing approximately $50 million annually. For those three years, that 
property tax credit program reversed the ratio of provincial to local funding for education from 
40–60 to 60–40 for farm properties, but not for residential and commercial properties. 
During the 2007 election campaign the two major parties pledged different strategies 
for reducing the pressures on the property tax base created by the levies of school boards. 
Whereas the NDP pledged to continue offering its education property tax credit program, the 
Saskatchewan Party pledged to find a ''long term solution'' for funding education that would 
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reduce pressures on the property tax system without compounding the financial needs of 
school boards.  
Shortly after its election victory the Saskatchewan Party government, led by Premier 
Brad Wall, produced a report on the property tax system. The report, released in January 2009 
contained four reform options that were very similar to the reforms implemented in Alberta, 
Ontario, and Manitoba (Reiter, 2009). Ultimately, the provincial government opted for a model 
comparable to the one in Alberta, whereby it would impose a uniform property tax levy on the 
entire property tax base, but would allow the Catholic school boards to impose their own levies 
on Catholics who wanted their taxes directed to those particular school boards. As in Alberta, the 
authority of Catholic school boards to impose those levies was subject to one key condition: if 
those boards set levies higher than those set by the province, the provincial government grants 
would be reduced accordingly to “ensure that school division equity is maintained” 
(Saskatchewan Government, 2009; Saskatchewan Ministry of Finance, 2009; Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2009). Given that condition, as well as some other considerations, the 
Catholic school boards opted not to impose their own levies.  
In the 2009–2010 budget the provincial government introduced two other interrelated 
reforms to funding the education system. The first was the elimination of the existing K–12 
Foundation Operating Grant system and the formula it used in distributing the funds among 
school boards for two years, with the promise that an even better grant system would be 
introduced in conjunction with the 2011–2012 budget. The second reform was that until 2011 
school board budgets would be frozen at the 2008–2009 levels, subject only to a minor 
adjustment to offset additional costs resulting from contractual obligations for salaries and 
inflation. The budget freeze created considerable consternation among school boards trustees 
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(Saskatchewan School Boards Association, 2010). That consternation was compounded in 
February 2011 when, just one month prior to tabling the provincial budget, the government 
announced that the adoption of a new formula would have to wait at least until the provincial 
budget for 2012–2013 (Gousseau, 2011). 
In an effort to make the property tax reforms appealing to ratepayers and municipalities 
the provincial government announced three other initiatives in the 2009–2010 budget. The first 
was an education property tax credit for agricultural, residential, and commercial properties. The 
second was a reduction in the amount of funding for the education system from the property tax 
base, and an increase in the percentage of funding for that system from the general revenue fund 
from 51% in 2008–2009, to 63% in 2009–2010, and 66% in 2010–2011. Those reductions, 
combined with others that had been implemented by the NDP during that decade, essentially 
reversed the proportion of funding from the property tax base and the provincial general revenue 
fund (Boughen, 2003; Auld & Kitchen, 2006; Saskatchewan Government, 2009; Saskatchewan 
Ministry of Finance, 2009). The third initiative, designed primarily to appeal to municipalities, 
was a promise to gradually increase provincial grants over the next few years up to the amount 
generated from one percentage point—or 20%—of its 5% provincial sales tax. For 2009–2010, 
in which only 90% of that one percentage point was transferred to municipalities in the form of 
grants, this budgetary measure resulted in an increase of approximately 20% from the previous 
fiscal year (Saskatchewan Government 2009; Saskatchewan Ministry of Finance 2009). The 
provincial government eventually fulfilled its promise of the full one percentage point in the 
budget of 2011 (Saskatchewan Government, 2011a; Saskatchewan Government, 2011b; 
Saskatchewan Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
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While those measures helped make the education funding reforms appealing to 
ratepayers and municipal associations, school boards continued to be concerned about the effect 
they would have on their ability to operate the education system. Those concerns persisted until 
the tabling of the 2012–2013 provincial budget, which included the new funding formula, and an 
overall funding increase of $82 million, or 5%, over the previous fiscal year. The increase, which 
ended a three-year funding freeze, provided school boards with a total of $1.74 billion from the 
provincial government (Warren, 2012; Government of Saskatchewan, 2012). The new funding 
formula provided a funding increase to most, though not all, school divisions across the province 
ranging from 1.7% to 14.4% (Government of Saskatchewan, 2012). Whereas some school 
divisions were satisfied with the budget allocations under the new formula, others were 
dissatisfied because they were constrained to make some unanticipated and difficult budget 
adjustments (Clarke, 2012). 
Whereas the provincial government was able to deal with the funding arrangements for 
public and Catholic school boards through negotiations, failed negotiations with the Conseil des 
écoles Fransaskois (CÉF) resulted in court challenges in 2011 and 2012. These two court 
challenges were preceded by the CÉF’s court challenge in 2004 and its threat of a court action in 
2009. Whereas the 2004 lawsuit resulted in an out of court settlement for an interim funding 
arrangement, the threat of a court challenge led the provincial government to grant it an extra  
$4 million and to enter into a mediation process for future funding. 
The CÉF’s 2011court challenge was launched due to the lack of progress during that 
mediation process, a budget shortfall of approximately two to three million dollars faced by the 
CÉF that would require it to lay off some staff, and the provincial government’s decision in 2011 
to defer until 2012 the implementation of a new funding formula that the CÉF hoped would have 
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increased provincial funding (Gousseau, 2011; Couture, 2011; Couture, 2012). In its case the 
CÉF claimed that although the amount of money provided by the provincial government was 
either the same or even slightly higher on a per capita basis than what the government provided 
to the other school divisions, it was still not enough. The CÉF’s justification for requesting 
additional funding was it was a relatively young board with limited infrastructure, resources and 
reserves, and small schools that made it impossible to achieve economies of scale comparable to 
those of other school divisions (Couture, 2011; Couture 2012). In May 2011 the Court of 
Queen’s Bench ruled that the provincial government was obliged to provide $2.8 million in 
interim funding until a negotiated settlement could be reached on an adequate and equitable 
funding formula for the CÉF’s schools (CÉF, 2012). The court added that, if a negotiated 
settlement could not be reached, either party was within its rights to return to the courts to review 
the fiscal needs of the CÉF. One year later, in the wake of failed negotiations, the CÉF filed 
another court challenge in May 2012 (CÉF, 2012). In its notice of motion, filed in May 2012, it 
requested funding to cover some of its costs for 2011–2012 and for the 2012–2013. In its 
decision the Court ordered the province to give the CÉF $3.3 million in addition to the $26.63 
million that it was giving it pursuant to the existing funding formula for 2012–2013 (Warren, 
2012).  
The reforms introduced by the Saskatchewan Party government after winning the 2007 
election were supported by several major stakeholders, including business associations and 
municipal associations, which had been seeking a solution for what they perceived as high 
property taxes for education. The Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM), and the Saskatchewan Urban 
Municipalities Association (SUMA) all supported the reforms in the hope that they would result 
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in lower property taxes and increased economic development investments at the local level 
(Greater Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce, 2009; SARM, 2009a; SARM, 2009b; SUMA, 
2009a; SUMA, 2012b). SARM and SUMA also hoped that as part of the reforms the provincial 
government would devote more funds to education from the General Revenue Fund, thereby 
increasing the property tax room available for municipalities.  
The reforms were opposed by the public and private school boards and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, also by the Saskatchewan Teachers’ Federation (STF). School boards voiced their 
concern about the impact on their autonomy and possibly also on the level of funding they would 
receive from a funding system that was completely controlled either directly or indirectly by the 
provincial government. They demanded that the provincial government either allow them to 
impose taxes or guarantee them adequate and predictable funding to cover their costs (“Budget 
gets near unanimous thumbs up,” 2009). Although it supported the demands of the school boards 
for guarantees of adequate funding and shared some of their concerns regarding potential loss of 
autonomy in managing and funding education activities, the STF was less concerned than school 
boards regarding their loss of authority in setting property tax rates and “cautiously optimistic” 
that the reforms would result in more equitable funding across school divisions (Saskatchewan 
Teachers Federation, 2009). Concerns and criticisms of the reforms by school boards were 
echoed by the NDP in its capacity as the official opposition, which criticized them both on 
substantive and the procedural grounds (Wotherspoon, 2009). The NDP, headed by former 
Premier Lorne Calvert, depicted the reforms as a “neutering” of the duly elected school trustees 
of their ability to tax, and criticized the government for implementing the reforms with minimal 
consultations with school boards and minimal information to the public (Calvert, 2009).  
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Manitoba Reforms 
Reforms to Manitoba’s education funding system during the past quarter century have 
been much more limited in scope than those in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan. This is 
particularly true regarding provincial governments supplanting school boards in setting property 
tax levies. A full appreciation of reforms to Manitoba’s education system in the past two decades 
requires an understanding of reforms that were implemented by the provincial government a 
decade earlier. In 1981 Premier Sterling Lyon’s Conservative government enacted a reform that 
created a property taxation framework for education consisting of two components: the first, 
known as the Special Levy (SL), was administered by the local school boards, and the second, 
known as the Education Support Levy (ESL), was administered by the provincial government. 
This marked an important step in the provincial government’s efforts to secure its own pool of 
funds from the property tax base that it could distribute to school boards based on its own 
priorities and formulas.  
The most notable reforms to funding the education system in Manitoba during the past 
two decades have focused on the ESL. More specifically, they have focused on the types of 
properties to which the ESL is applied and the level to which it is applied for each type of 
property. In 2001, the NDP government was constrained to begin acting on the pledge to 
eliminate the ESL as a result of recommendations in a report by the Association of Manitoba 
Municipalities (AMM) for a total shift in funding for education from the property tax base to the 
provincial general revenue fund. A few months later, in response to that report the Minister of 
Education announced that the ESL levy would be phased out on residential properties within 
three years and on all other properties within five years (Owens, 2005). After more than a decade 
that promise has still not been fulfilled fully because to date the ESL has only been eliminated 
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from residential properties, but not from commercial and industrial properties. Thus, unlike 
governments in the other three provinces, successive Manitoba governments have not only 
allowed all school boards to continue levying the SL, but they have limited the application of the 
ESL to two of the three major categories of properties, and reduced the overall amount of funds 
generated from that particular levy. 
In the years following the 1999 election, Premier Doer’s government implemented two 
other notable reforms to deal with the financial pressures experienced by school boards and 
property owners at that time. The first was increasing provincial transfers to school board to fund 
education. The second was a rebate program for residential properties that paid an equal flat rate 
to all homeowners regardless of their assessment (Levin, 2005, p. 129). The rebate, increased 
gradually over time from $250 in 1999, to $400 in 2007, and to $700 in 2011 (Henley & Young, 
2008; Owen, 2011; Manitoba Finance, 2011).  
The reforms to date have had two notable effects. First, there was a sizeable shift in the 
amount and proportion of funds generated from the ESL and the SL. Whereas the amount of 
revenues generated from the province’s ESL declined by $58.4 million over approximately one 
decade from $199.2 million in 1999–2000 to $140.8 million in 2011–12, the amount of revenues 
generated from the school boards’ SL increased by $332.5 million from $401.7 million in 1999–
2000 to $734.2 million in 2011–12 (Baker, 2013; Manitoba Education, 2011; Manitoba 
Education and Training, 1999, p. 51). Those particular reforms did not alleviate the financial 
pressures faced by school boards, as evidenced by the adverse effects a reduction in provincial 
grants to school boards in 2012 that required them to reduce costs and increase their own 
property tax rates. The financial pressures resulted from two decisions of the provincial 
government: one was the elimination of an incentive grant that had been in place for four years 
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to keep their property taxes low, the other was limiting the increase in overall funding by tying it 
to the rate of economic growth (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2012).  
Second, collectively, those reforms helped achieve a slight reduction in the level of 
reliance on the property tax base for funding the education system. Between 2002 and 2006 there 
was a minor decline in the property tax portion of funding for education from its peak of 50.4% 
in 2002 to 46.9% in 2006 (Henley & Young, 2008). A minor decline was also evident over the 
longer term. Whereas in 1989 the combined provincial and local property tax portion of 
education funding was 45% (Auld & Kitchen, 2006), by 2008 it had declined by 3% to 42% 
(Reiter, 2009). This was much less than the more substantial decline in the reliance on the 
property tax base for funding education in Alberta and Ontario. Despite this decline, school 
boards in Manitoba, unlike all their counterparts in other provinces, other than their separate  
school board counterparts in Alberta, have not had their property taxation authority usurped 
either completely or almost completely by the provincial government.  
The genesis of the reforms to the ESL was a pledge by NDP leader, Gary Doer, during 
the 1999 provincial election campaign to gradually phase out at least the residential portion of 
the ESL. Starting shortly after forming the government in 1999, the Doer government 
implemented three sets of reforms designed to deal with demands for changes sought by school, 
municipal, and business associations to alleviate the financial pressures being experienced within 
the educational, municipal, and business sectors due to the amount of funding required from the 
property tax base for the education system. Those pressures had been created in part by the 
decisions of Premier Gary Filmon’s Conservative government to reduce provincial transfers to 
education boards by 6% between 1993 and 1998, ostensibly due to budgetary constraints (Henley 
& Young, 2008, p. 9). To make up for the shortfall, school boards cut expenditures and raised 
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their own mill rates. The result was that between 1994 and 1999 the percentage of education 
funding derived from the SL imposed by school boards increased from 28.3% to 33.4% (Henley 
& Young, 2008, p. 9). 
The pressures generated by the amount of funding for education derived from the 
property tax system led to a growing informal coalition of major organizations in Manitoba that 
has existed at least since 1999. The coalition advocated the creation of a new funding framework 
that would be less reliant on the property tax base. Over time the coalition has involved the 
Manitoba Teachers’ Society (MTS), the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM), the 
Manitoba Real Estate Association (MREA), the Canadian Taxpayer’s Foundation (CTF), and 
Winnipeg City Council. To some extent it even involved the Manitoba School Boards 
Association (MSBA), which unlike the other associations in the province wanted increased 
provincial funding to achieve an 80–20 funding ratio between provincial government and school 
boards rather than full funding by the provincial government (Henley & Young, 2008; Levin, 
2005, pp. 133–135). Despite calls for substantial reforms from those major organizations, 
successive NDP governments made only minor adjustments to the funding system, without 
radically altering either its basic components, or the alignment of roles, responsibilities, and level 
of control between them and the school boards. This stands in stark contrast not only to what 
happened in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan during the past two decades, but also to what 
happened in the other six provinces approximately one decade earlier. 
 Clearly, Manitoba is an anomaly among provinces in this respect. Furthermore, it is a 
paradoxical anomaly because increasing the degree of centralization of authority and 
responsibility for raising and distributing funds for education did not occur despite the fact that 
there was a higher degree of consensus among the major governmental and non-governmental 
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stakeholders, other than the provincial government, to do so than in the other three provinces. 
This begs the question of what accounts for this anomaly vis-à-vis all other provinces, or at least 
vis-à-vis Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan. There are several plausible answers to that 
questions that focus on philosophical, political, and economic factors. However, the most 
plausible explanation in our view is that unlike their counterparts in the other three provinces, 
successive Manitoba governments did not want to assume exclusive or extensive financial and 
political responsibility for funding the education system. Their willingness to reduce and 
possibly eliminate the ESL and also to implement modest increases to the amount of funding 
from the general revenue fund were intended to appease stakeholders seeking a reduction in 
reliance on the property tax base; but not a commitment to a radical shift in control and 
responsibility for funding education from school boards to the provincial government. They felt  
that they did not have either the requisite financial or political capital to achieve a radical shift in 
authority and responsibility. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the education funding reforms of the past two decades in the three Prairie 
provinces and Ontario have resulted in shifts in authority between school boards and provincial 
governments in generating funding from the property tax base and in their respective 
responsibility for funding primary and secondary education. Unlike Alberta, Ontario, and 
Saskatchewan, where authority for setting mill rates for property taxes was centralized in the 
provincial governments, in Manitoba it was decentralized slightly to the school boards. Despite 
the similarities between Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, there were some notable 
differences. Whereas the Alberta provincial government usurped the authority of public school 
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boards but not of the separate school boards in setting property tax mill rates, the Ontario and 
Saskatchewan provincial governments usurped the authority of both the public and separate 
school boards. Moreover, whereas in Alberta and Saskatchewan Catholic school boards were 
given the option on whether they wanted to retain their authority to impose the property tax levy 
or have a provincially imposed levy, in Ontario neither Catholic nor public school boards were 
given that option. The slight decentralization in Manitoba occurred as a result of the provincial 
government’s decision to create more tax room on the property tax base for school boards by 
eliminating the provincial education tax on some categories of properties.  
The centralization of authority for setting property tax mill rates and responsibility for 
funding education in Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan during the past two decades has 
resulted in a policy convergence between those three provinces and the other six that had 
achieved such centralization in previous decades. In those nine provinces the provincial 
governments have taken either complete or almost complete control of the property tax base as a 
revenue source for funding education. Manitoba is the notable exception in this convergence 
because its school boards have retained their authority in imposing their own property taxes for 
raising a substantial proportion of funding for their respective education systems. 
The reforms in the three Prairie provinces and Ontario have been driven and shaped 
primarily by the interests of the provincial governments, school boards, and municipalities to 
advance some of their respective policy goals. The principal goals of provincial governments 
have been to maximize equity not only in the level of property taxes paid by ratepayers for 
properties of comparable value, but also in the level of funding available to school divisions. For 
some provincial governments the objective has also been to attempt to reduce or at least contain 
the overall cost of education. In the case of school boards, some of them hoped that they might 
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fare better financially under a centralized system in which provincial government not only set the 
property tax levies but also facilitated a more equitable redistribution of the property taxes that 
were collected. In the case of municipalities and business associations a key goal was reducing 
the pressure on the property tax base created by taxation rates set by school boards. Their hope 
was that, if provincial governments became responsible for setting mill rates for education 
property taxes, it would result in provincial governments paying a higher proportion education 
costs from their respective general revenue funds. Further research is required to determine the 
extent to which the reforms have contributed to the goals of the provincial and municipal 
governments, school boards, municipalities, and business associations.  
In looking to the future, three important and interrelated sets of questions emerge 
regarding potential reforms to the funding frameworks for education in the three Prairie 
provinces and Ontario, as well as in the other provinces. The first set of questions relates to 
whether the proverbial pendulums for funding the education systems will remain where they are 
now after the reforms of recent decades or whether they are likely to continue to swing?  
Moreover, insofar as they may swing, will they swing even further toward centralization leading 
to an even greater loss of authority and autonomy for school boards not only in raising revenues 
from various sources but possibly also in managing their budgets, or will they swing back toward 
decentralization whereby they would regain some of the authority and responsibility they have 
lost for funding the system, and possibly acquiring even more than they had prior to the reforms 
of the past two decades? 
The second set of questions relates to future trends both in the sources of funding and in 
the levels and proportions of funding from each of those sources for the education systems. More 
specifically, will education become increasingly and possibly even fully funded from provincial 
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revenues from the property tax base, or from the provincial general revenue funds as has been 
advocated by various municipal associations over time? Furthermore, will provincial governments 
grant school boards greater authority and autonomy either for accessing alternative revenue 
sources (e.g., user fees) or for leveraging their assets in building and operating schools through 
various means, including public–private partnerships?  
The third set of questions relates to the factors or forces that will shape the focus and 
scope of future reforms. Will they continue to be shaped primarily by the interests of provincial 
and municipal governments and school boards, or will they also be shaped even more by the 
interests of other stakeholders, including those of various categories of ratepayers and the parents 
of school age children? Moreover, to what extent will the evolving financial or political interests 
and imperatives of provincial governments, school boards, municipalities, and business 
associations shape such reforms?  
Answers to these as well as other related questions are highly contingent on a range of 
factors. The most important factors, of course, continue to be the following: first, the interests 
and imperatives of provincial governments in pursuing various policy and political goals; and 
second, the extent to which school boards are able to maintain their legitimacy and power to 
mount convincing arguments both to governments and to ratepayers and parents of school age 
children about the governance and funding models they believe should exist within their 
respective educational systems. If they do not maintain their legitimacy and power school boards 
run the risk of becoming obsolete (Owens, 1999). For all school boards, and particularly for 
those that have lost control of the proverbial “power of the purse” to generate revenues, it is 
imperative that they maintain their legitimacy and power to manage both their revenues and the 
delivery of education efficiently, effectively, and equitably with the requisite degrees of 
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transparency and accountability.  
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